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The concluding chapter (pp. 213-226) traces the themes of Christian 
patience and hope. It also traces the developing doctrine of positive 
nonviolence in Tertullian, Origen, and Lactantius. 
Hornus is to be commended for his penetrating analysis of both the 
historical and theological issues involved. His study is of greatest impor- 
tance in assessing correctly the attitudes toward war, violence, and the state 
during the first four centuries of the church. 
Andrews University GERHARD F. HASEL 
Rice, Richard. The Openness of God: The Relationship of Divine Fore- 
knowledge and Human Free Will. Nashville, Tenn.: Review and 
Herald Publishing Association, 1980. 95 pp. Paperback, $4.95. 
This vigorous and tightly written little book, the first by a young 
theologian whose Chicago dissertation was a study of process theologian 
Charles Hartshorne, attempts to distance itself in some respects from 
process theology but owes much to it. It is a brave attack upon what the 
author calls "the traditional understanding of God's relation to the world," 
according to which God is sovereign and omnipotent, in complete control 
of events, having perfect foreknowledge, sitting enthroned outside of time 
as Lord over time, with past, present, and future all as one to him. 
Rice insists that to hold this traditional understanding is to make 
human free will an illusion or to be guilty of intellectual laziness, 
entangled in all sorts of contradictions. Against it, Rice brings what he 
calls "the open view of God," according to which God experiences time 
and events serially, in principle just as we do. He is not changeless, but 
rather he is ever learning, ever experiencing new things. He does not know 
the future decisions which men will freely make as individuals, nor does 
he know the consequences that will flow from those decisions, because 
those decisions have not yet been made and are therefore not there to 
know. But God is clever: he knows all the options and can anticipate any 
eventuality. Though God plays the game fairly and the "cards are not 
stacked," the final outcome is assured because he is so good at the game. 
No matter what may go wrong, he has a contingency plan. 
By taking this position, Rice thinks to solve some age-old conundrums 
and resolve such ancient antinomies and dilemmas as that posed by David 
Hume: "Is He willing to prevent evil, but not able? then He is impotent. Is 
He both able and willing? whence then is evil?" Rice believes his view 
makes more rational the idea of free will, replacing the notion of predes- 
tination with the concept of perfect anticipation and skillful planning. 
God becomes more sympathetic and egalitarian, and creatures become 
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more important. Thus, God is not able to prevent evil, but he knows how 
to mitigate it. Perhaps Hume would have said that such a position 
attributes to God mitigated impotence. 
This reviewer fails to see how Rice's "open view" really resolves any 
of the dilemmas it addresses, except by ignoring one of the horns. Further- 
more, whether or not his God "stacks the cards," Rice does. He compares 
the foreseeing of future decisions to the making of a square circle, but that 
is a specious analogy; a better analogy is making a circle into a square, 
which God can do. Is it any more wonderful to assert that God has perfect 
diachronic knowledge than to say he has perfect synchronic knowledge? - . 
Furthermore, Rice fails to acknowledge the elusiveness of the whole 
idea of freedom, inadequately defining it as involving "the absence of 
external compulsion." Since one of his major motives is to protect the idea 
of freedom, we must require him to develop this notion with the same 
degree of theological and philosophical rigor which he has attempted to 
apply to divine sovereignty. Nor has he fully solved the problem of evil, 
for even though his God does not have absolute foreknowledge, God is 
supposed to have the cleverness and resourcefulness not to let evil get out 
of hand! But a fireman who has the skill to put out a fire, but fails to do 
so, is not much less culpable than a fireman who fails to prevent a fire. 
Rice concedes that God can limit the options available. So freedom is not 
total, after all. T o  use an unseemly metaphor, God lets the devil win a few 
hands (why?) but holds the trump card all the time. T o  change the 
metaphor, the whole problem is turned into a "cat-and-mouse" game. On 
the other hand, Rice feels that God can only respond to human decisions 
and events, not control them, which makes him a slave, not the master, of 
all that happens. Rice has, in short, removed determinism far from man, 
only to threaten God with it instead. 
Rice is concerned to deal with biblical objections to his view. For 
example, he has a sort of futurological model of prophecy. God can 
predict because of the inevitable consequences of present realities, because 
of his own intentions to act, and because of a combination of these two 
factors. But does not the mention of inevitability reintroduce the specter of 
determinism? 
Rice claims that his view provides "support of neaturely significance," 
and we may agree that it makes the sizes of God and man a little more 
nearly equal. But not everyone will regard human responsibility and 
potency as a "basis for hope and optimism" (p. 80)!- Rice's theology has 
the merit of giving integrity to prayer, but when it comes to intercessory 
prayer even he cannot avoid mystery and paradox, things which he usually 
finds quite distasteful. Perhaps when he meditates on matters longer he 
may find the mystery and paradox again extending over areas where he 
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had thought to expel them. Rice mistakes one side of the truth for the 
whole, but at least he lays out that one side with clarity. 
The cover design by Dean Tucker is gorgeous. 
Andrews University ROBERT M. JOHNSTON 
